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ÖZET
PETKİM ÖZELİNDE
TÜRKİYE’DEKİ KAMU TEŞEKKÜLLERİNİN ÖZELLEŞTİRİLMESİ
MEHMET S, ÖZBAY 
YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZİ
BÎLKENT ÜNİVERSİTESİ - ANKARA HAZİRAN 1990 
Tez Yöneticisi : Dr. Gökhan Çapoğlu
Bu çalışma petrolcimya sektöründe Türkiye’de tekel durumundaki bir kamu kuruluşu 
olan PETKİM özelinde Türkiye’deki Kamu İktisadi Teşekküllerinin ( KİT ) 
özelleştirilmesini ele almaktadır. Çalışma dört ana bölıömden oluşmaktadır :
Birinci bölümde KİT’lerIn tanımı verilmiş, kamu sektörünün dünya ülkelerinin 
ekonomilerindeki yeri ve özellikle gelişmekte olan ülkelerin endüstrileşme 
sürecindeki rolü ve genel sorunları tartışılmıştır.
İkinci bölüm özelleştirmenin genel tanımını ve Tıjrkiye’deki uygulamasını genel 
batlarıyla kapsamaktadır.
Üçüncü bölümde eski teknolojilerden ve maddi yetersizliklerden kaynaklanan 
sorunları ışığında PETKİM’e uygulanabilecek özelleştirme yöntemleri tartışılmıştır.
Son bölümde özelleştirmenin yolaçacagı beklenen sonuçlar ve ilgili yorumlar 
sunulmuştur.
ABSTRACT
PRIVATISATION OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISES IN TURKEY 
THECASEOEPETKIM 
BY
MEHMET S. ÖZBAY 
MBA THESIS
BILKENT UNIVERSITY- ANKARA JULY 1990 
Sı^ervisor: Dr. Gökhan Çapoglu
This research analyzes the concept of privatisation of Turkish state economic 
enterprises (SEE’s) th ro içh  the specific case of PETKIM, a public petrochemical 
monopoly. It consists of four parts.
In the first part. a<Iescription of public enterprises is given. The extent of the public 
sector in the -world, the origins of industrialisation by SEE’s in developing countries 
are discussed. This part ends with the description of the common problems of SEE’s 
such as insufficient financial performance or inefficient management.
The second part starts with the definition of privatisation. Then, the objectives of 
privatisation in Turkey and its implementation are described.
The third part of this research tries to investigate the problems that PETKIM faces at 
the stage of privatisation. The lack of economies of scale and outdated technology of 
some of its plants are the major ones. Then, several methods of privatisation for 
PETKIM are evaluated.
In the lost part, the Implications of privatisation are analyzed and in each case some 
recommendations are made. The mein issues are the use of the proceeds from 
privatisation and the impacts of privatisation on productive, allocative and 
managerial efficiencies.
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INTRODUCTION
Many <le'Vieloplng countries undertook their Industrialization through the 
establishment of state-otmed enterprises. Ideologically, a large public role In the 
economy "tras seen as necessary for rapid and sustained development. Also, to 
overcome critical bottlenecks and for national security reasons, developing countries 
created large heavy industries. In addition, the short supply of local prorate 
enterpreneurs, the ease to access to financial sources of the public sector vere added 
to these justifications.
Governments, for longtime, believed that public enterprises 'vould generate large 
profits irtth vhich they vould be able to finance investments in priority sectors of 
the economy.
Howver, since the beginning of the 80’s, public enterprises In many countries are 
being privatised.
Turkish government, follovring this trend took many of its big public enterprises 
into privatisation programs.
Privatisation is, nowadays, a highly controversial issue. Although, it is severly 
criticized in the countries vhere it is applied, privatisation continues to be adopted 
by increasing number of countries.
This research analyzes Turkish privatisation through the specific case of Petkim, a 
public monopoly in the petrochemical industry.
Current situation and potential problems of this public enterprise are investigated. 
The need for transfer of oimership and the impacts of the privatisation are analyzed.
It Is noted that, PETKIM, in spite of its dominant position in the Turkish market. Is 
characterized by Insufficient capacity compared to foreign competitors.
The lack of economies of scale, together irith the abuse of the protective tariffs result 
to a decrease in efficiency.
In that context, this research tries to ansi/er the critical question of whether or not 
the change of ownership will contribute a significant improvement in terms of 
efficiency.
I STATE ECONOMIC ENTERPRl SES
1.1. Size of the Sector
State Economic Enterprises ( SEEs) are government ovned ( more than 50% ) and 
controlled entities vhich are supposed to earn most of their revenue from the sale of 
goods and services and have a separate legal identity. They are important financial 
and economic actors. Vorldudde, at the beginning of the 1980’s, they voere estimated 
to account for an average of 54 % of GDP at factor cost excluding the United 
States · . SEES have been important in industrialized as veil as in centrally-planned 
end developing countries.
For Instance, Great Britain’s public enterprise sector, prior to 1979, accounted to 
exactly 10% of GDP, had £ 55 billion in turnover, and employed 1.75 million 
people. In France, after the 1981 nationalizations, public enterprises employed 
16.6 % of all salaried vorkers and contributed 17.2 of value added excluding 
agricultural sector . In less developed countries ( LDC ) ,  SEEs account for 50 % of 
national totals in value added in manufacturing, 25 % in total investment and 15 % 
on the average in nonagrlcultural employment 2. For instance in Turkey, the share 
of the public sector is 17.8 % of GNP ^ .
1.2. Origins or SEES in LDCS
Governments in many developing countries created SEEs to provide goods and 
services or to serve social goals, the private sector appeared unvllllng or incapable 
to offer.
The fact that industrialization in LDCs is accompanied by the establishment of SEEs 
has both ideological and pragmatic reasons.
Ideologically, it vas thought that to develop, governments need to hold and lead from 
the commanding heights of the economy. This vas based on generally socialist 
reasoning, vhich argued that public enterprises vould generate surpluses vhich 
government planners could then Invest in high priority areas. This vas supposed to •
• Short, R.P.et.al.(1984 )
2 Nellis, J.ondKikeri, S. (1989)
3 Kepenek, Y. (1990 )
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lead to more rapid and rational development of the economy than vould occur if 
major investment and resource allocation decisions vere left to private sector.
On the other hand, pragmatic reason vas the lack of other alternatives than public 
enterprises. In fact, in many LDCs, there vas no local private sector, or the local 
private sector vas small, insufficiently developped, had limited access to capital and 
VQS technologically underdevelopped.
I - 3. Public^Ejiterprises or_ Ref orm.
The period between the mid-1960s and the early 1980s vere characterized by the 
rapid expansion of the public sector of the developing vorld. On the average, SEEs 
accounted for 27.0 % of the gross fixed capital formation > .
Hovever, the performance of the SEEs is generally considered to be unsatisfactory. 
The average overall deficits of the developing countries accounted for 3.9 % of the 
GDP 2.
Thus, in the majority of LDCs, SEEs have not reached the original expectations of 
their creators in terms of performance. Many SEEs loose m oney, or do not make as 
much money as they should, given that they often benefit from privileged access to 
capital, various subsidies and protection from domestic and foreign competition.
Yet, in every developing country one vill find one or several SEEs, or even vhole 
subsectors vhich, despite severe problems, still menage to run at profit. For 
instance, a survey of the 40 SEEs in Africa shoved that, in 1984, 10 of the firms 
reported net profit margins greater than 10 % ^ .
In many of these cases, profitable performance vill be due to competent, hard 
vorking managers, using their resources in a sharp manner, either vith  
government assistance, or because the managers ere capable of resisting production- 
reducing or cost-increslng demands of the government. Also, sometimes profit vill 
be made not due to the efforts of the management but due to the exploitation of a •
• Short, ( 1984 )
2 Short, ( 1984 )
 ^Nellis, J. end Kikeri, S. (1989 )
monopoly i>osition or government pricing policy vhich ellovs en inefficient 
operation to make money.
Some SEES moke a short run profit, obtained at the expense of an inappropriate long 
term Investment. In a number of countries, government-imposed distorsions such as
an overvalued exchange rate or real negative interest rate allov firms to generate 
profits because they are paying less for Inputs or capital.
Thus, some SEEs vhich are making money vould not be if they тега not protected. 
Therefore, financial proñtabílity is not often a complete end accurate measure of SEE 
performance.
Also, SEE’s deficits or investments are, in many cases, financed by government 
transfers. Although these transfers are temporarily defencible, depending on the 
quality of Investments undertaken, dependence to government assistance of the SEEs 
become usually chronicle. For instance, lov electricity prices may be socially 
desirable but governments may have to subsidy the associated cost of this lov price 
policy interminably.
In addition to lov financial performance, SEEs generally lack of managerial 
efficiency. The reason is that, though SEE managers often knov vhat they should do 
to maximize the returns on the resources at their disposal, they do not possess the 
autonomy vhich vould allov them to take both revenue increase and cost reduction 
measures. Also, SEE managers are usually constrained to continue uneconomic 
product lines and loss-making plants. Necessary government approvals for budgets. 
Investments, procurement and hiring take time and add to administrative 
transaction and supply costs. Managers and other vorkers are often recruited on 
criteria other than technical competence. Board of directors are composed of civil 
servants vho defend ministerial interests rather than promoting the velfare of the 
firm.
These constraints on efficient operation are vell-knovn end videspread. In fact, 
many LDC governments embarked on reform programs in order to increase the 
performance of their SEEs by clarifying and simplifying often contradictory 
objectives such as maximizing profit along vlth  social and distributional goals, 
depollticizlng and improving the technical competence of management.
II PRIVATISATIOII
II. 1. Definition
The remits of rehabilitation measures adopted by many countries læ re modest under 
continued state cnmership. Therefore, nev  policies vere sought and in 1979 in 
United Kingdom ( UK. )  under the conservative government of Margaret Thatcher 
large scale privatisation policies of SEEs i/ere adopted. Since then U K.’s privatisation 
program has been iridely noted and imitated by industrialized countries as veil as 
developing countries. 80‘s are characterized by -widespread privatisation of public 
sector throughout the -world.
Privatisaton, in its -very broad sense, is the reduction of the public sector in the 
economy. It represents a countermo-vement to the grovth of government that has 
characterized much of the past Vorld-Var II period and especially the period from 
60s to mid 70s in industrial and de-veloping countries. In its narro-wer sense, 
pri-vatisation is the transfer of the economic enterprises o-wned and managed by the 
government, to private sector. The essence of the privatisation is the transfer of 
o-wnershlp from the government to private sector. The transfer of o-wnershlp has two 
implications ;
- Getting the state economic enterprises out of the control and intervention field of 
the government.
- Decreasing the debts of these enterprises to the budget.
The first implication is more important for the economy since it allo-ws an o-wnership 
transfer providing also a management transfer. The second one necessitates the sale 
of the inefficient company, if possible as vhole. The transfer of the o-wnership 
either totally or by giving the majority of the shares, means ob-viously the 
pri-vatisation of the mangement, as -well.
Ho-wever, in order to get the management out of the control of the go-vernment, it is 
not necessary to totally abolish public ownership. A change in ownership which 
provides management transfer is also included in the privatisation definition. In 
addition. In some enterprises, government may have a smell symbolic share called 
"golden share" in order to assure the success of the privatisation.
Although, privatisation is mainly the transformation of the public enterprises into 
capital companies by selling its stock to private individuals and institutions, it is 
often vieired as an "umbrella" concept covering different but related methods.
The policies tending to decrease the government activities in the economy may 
include methods of private ilnanclng of publicly produced goods and services such as 
bridge and tolls on hlghTrays. Other methods Include the breaking of the public 
monopolies by allowing free competition to be established such as for tea and tobacco 
products in Turkey. Also, in order to provide an efficient management to non- 
profitable organizations, several other methods exist such as leasing and contracting 
out to private sector or offerings and making management contract. Beside of these, 
public and private sector Joint ventures or grants and vouchers to aid some smell 
consumers methods are also present under this large umbrella. Hovever, these 
methods do not involve the transfer of oimershlp thus they can not bo considered as 
actual privatisation techniques.
II.2. Privatisation in Turkey
11.2.1 Turkish Public Sector
Industrialization in Turkey has been accompanied by the establishment of SEEs. In 
the years folloiring the declaration of the republic in 1923, the nev  government 
adopted a statist development policy. The desire to form a national industry as a 
protective measure against foreign economic dominance, the lack of capital markets 
and the nonexistance of private ventures together irtth distributional and social 
objectives of the government, public enterprises vere formed. Since then, many 
SEES теге established and the enterpreneurial role of the government continued. In 
the 50s and 60s , important га т  material producing SEEs теге formed such as 
PETKÎM in petrochemical indtjstry, SEKA in pulp and paper, and ÇÎT0SAN in cement 
industry.
As for 1987, the share of the public sector is 18.3 % of ONP in manufacturing sector. 
The share of the fixed investments of SEEs is 19.5 % of the total fixed Investments in 
1988. Also, SEEs are generally considered as source of employment in Turkey 
AlthotJgh, as a Thole, they account only for 4 . 4 %  of civil employment in 1987 
there are big variations concerning different subsectors. The figure is as Io t  as 0.1 
% for agricultural sector and as high as 71. 4 % for mining industry. The 
manufacturing sector accounts for 14 0 % of the total civil employment.
Nevertheless, the performence of SEEs are often considered as imsatisfactory and 
government authorities argued that they constitute a hürden to the economy. In fact, 
as mentioned earlier SEEs in every country have the access to financial support of the 
government easily and the policy of covering losses by either increasing output 
prices or by government transfers become usually a perpetual policy. The financial 
sources of SEEs in Turkey is mainly through foreign credits vhich accounted 61.0 % 
of total sources and 29,3 % from the budget in 1987. Hotre^'er, despite many 
counterarguments, it is difficult to argue that SEE's are too much dependent to the 
Treasury. If ve look at the Appendix Table-1 only in 1980 and 1984, the net cash flov 
from SEE's to Treasury is negative. As for the deficits, see Appendix Table-2 it can be 
seen that there is no overall loss since 1980 and for the manufacturing sector only in 
1983 a loss of TL 14 144 million is observed.
11.2.2 Objectives of Turkish Privatisation
Vithln the broad framevork of its free market oriented economic and financial 
policies, the Turkish government has been vigorously pursuing the gradual transfer 
of SEEs to private sector o ^ e rsh ip  as a means of reducing state involvement in 
corporate decision making, strengthening private initiative, increasing managerial 
efficiency and competition, stimulating capital market development by spreading 
share oimershlp and transfering technology through foreign investment.
11.2.3 Outline of the Preparotory Work for Privatisation
¥here  appropriate, SEEs vhich are to be privatized are transferred to the Housing 
Development and Public Participation Administration ( HDPPA ) by the decision of the 
council of ministers.
Prior to pri\'atisation, HDPPA becomes actively Involved in the management of public 
sector companies through the appointment of directors and the implementation of 
short term rehabilitation measures. To date, the privatisation of Teletaç, a 
telecommunications equipment manufacturer, and the sale of ANSAN and MEDA, soft 
drink bottling and distribution companies , respectively, have been completed 
successfully. In addition, the privatisation of five ÇÎT0SAN cement plants and USA?, 
the aircraft catering services company, are performed by direct selling method. 
HDPPA is also preparing the privatisation of PETICÎM and SÜMERBANK. In addition
HDPPA is ready to initiate the sale of the minority eqirity holdings of the state in 
several private sector companies, some of vhich are listed on the senior market of 
the İstanbul Stock Exchange.
111 THE CASE OF PETKİM
Privatisation -work related vith  PETKlM, undertaken by Samuel Montagu & Co. 
Limited and Türk Ekonomi Bankası A Ş., is nov entering its final phase. So far, John 
Broim Engineers and Constructors Limited have carried out plant surveys of all 
process plants at PETKİM’s operating subsidiaries and have advised on short term 
improvements and capital expenditure. Price Vaterhouse -vere retained to provide 
advise on management information systems, and marketing. Arthur Young -vere also 
retained to audit the accounts of PETKİM and its operating subsidiaries.
The financial advisors have identified a number of companies v ith  potential interest 
in acquiring shares in either the PETKİM group, its operating subsidiaries, 
individual plants or groups of plants, end are nov seeking further expressions of 
interest.
As of July 1990, a small portion around 7.5 ?♦ of total shares ere sold to public 
through banking sector and noiradays the stocks of PETKİM are started to be traded at 
the Istanbul Stock Exchange.
I I I .l . PETKİM
The history of Turkish petrochemical industry is very short since it has started only 
in the late sixties.
Hovnever, the first small plastic industries appeared in the 1930's using imported rav  
material. Until the end of the 50‘s no remarkable progress has been made in the 
area other then the establishments of small capacity plastic processing plants.
Nevertheless, at 1%2 first Turkish petroleum refinery started up. In 1963, tire 
industry le r e  launched and three firms in the field started the production using 
again imported ra v  material.
At these mid-sixties vorld petrochemical industry 'vere in full expansion. Turkish 
government folloiring this trend decided to implement a national petrochemical 
Industry.
As a result, by the initiatives of TPAO in April 3, 1%5 PETKÎM Petrokimya A .Ş. vas 
established.
The company has realized her first investment in Yarımca Petrochemical complex 
vhich if located in the vicinity of tzmit. The first five plant# of the complex "went on 
streetm in 1970. Perallel to the Increase of the domestic demand, nev  plants irere 
added and the initial plants теге expended, Tldenlng the production of Yarımca 
Complex. In 1977, PETKlM and her totally oimed subsidiary Petklm Kauçuk A.Ş. 
merged, adding synthetic rubbers to PETKİM’s chain of products.
Furthermore, considering the expeditious development of the country’s demand for 
petrochemicals, it t b s  considered essential to set up a second complex at Aliağa near 
Ismir, to meet the domestic demand fbr the goods produced at Yarımca es теП as for 
п е т  products. The construction of the plant began at 1975 en d in  1986 Aliağa 
complex started up.
Today, Turkish petrochemical Industry is dominated by PETKİM. It is the only 
producer of a number of products and therefore enjoys a monopoly in terms of 
production. See at Appendix Table-3, total volume consumption of petrochemical 
products in Turkey, PETKlM’s share of the m arket.
111.1.1. and Supply
The addition of ALPET production to that of YARPET since 1985. provided PETKÎM to 
meet the increasing domestic demand. In fact, Turkish plastic consumption per 
capitamore than doubled betTeen 1983 end 1987, increased from 4 .75 kg/capita to 
10.5 kg/capita.
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Table 1
Plastic consumption per capita for some selected petrochemicals
(kg/capita)
YEARS
PRODUCTS 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
PE 1.88 2.14 2,63 3.63 4.57
PVC 1.59 1.74 1.50 2.40 2.87
PS 0.36 0.33 0.75 0.74 1.02
PP 0,92 1.14 1.33 1.42 1.59
TOTAL 4.75 5.35 6.21 8.19 10.05
( Source : DPT, Petfoklmya 1990, page 30 )
This increase in consumption has resulted in an excess demand over stipply for 
several important products.
Table-2 The projected excess demand figures for the major end
products
PRODUCT 1994 (1000 tons)
Methanol %
ffbon Black 31
SBR 22
Styrene 79
LDPE 64
HD PE 66
PVC 121
PS 69
PP 102
ACN 103
LAB 47
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Гог PVC for example, the demand is expecte<l to be 273000 tons in 1994 vhereas the 
current capacity is only 152 000 tons. The necessary import values to meet the gap 
betTcen the demand and supply are as Го11от?5:
ТаЪ1е-3 Demand and Import Projectiont for PVC
YEARS
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Demand projections 186000 207 000 227000 249000 273 000
(to n s )
Import Projections 40000 61000 81000 88500 112 000
(to n s )
Value of Import 26 400 40 260 53 460 58420 73 920
( $  1000)
( Source: DPT,Petrokimya 1990, page414-415)
Thus 'TB noticed that on the average only for PVC a value of $ 50.5 million of 
Import expenditures are required each year up to 1994.
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The average import requirements for the other products for 1990-1994 period, ere 
as follonrs.
Table-4 Import of Petrochemicals
PRODUCTS Average Import Requirements ( $ million )
Methanol 30.0
Carbon Black 23.0
SBR 14.6
Styrene 32.9
LDPE 45.9
HD PE 405
PVC 50.5
PS 62.9
PP 74.9
ACN 82.8
LAB 39.7
TOTAL $497.7 mill
Thus each year $497.7 millions of import is required from 1990 to 1994 in terms of 
1987 dollar values.
These figures cover the import requirements of methanol and LAB vhich are not 
among the production portfolio of PETKIM.
From the above tables and data, it is seen that one of the most important problems of 
PETKiM is the insufficient production cepaclty of several of its plants. Also, It can be 
noticed from the projection up to 1994 that this problem Kill continue to increase if 
the current production capacity remains unchanged.
In fact, in this context a Master Plan has been prepared for PETKiM in 1988 by 
Chem-Systems, England · . According to this report PETKiM should undertake the 
beloT investments up to 1995 ;
« DPT (1990)
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ТаЪ1е-4 InTmrtment Requirements
PLAHTS
SBR
REQUIRED INVESTMEHTS 
Construction of a nev  plant of 
30 000 tons /  year capacity
Styrene Construction of a nev  plant of 
100 000 tons / year capacity
PS Construction of a nev  plant of 
60 000 tons / year capacity
Carbon Black Expansion of the existing plant 
from 30 000 tons / year capacity 
to 54 000 tons / year
PP Expansion of the existing plant 
from 66 000 tons / year capacity
to 90 000 tons / year
HD PE The current capacity should be 
doubled
LDPE Current capacity should be 
expended
ACN Current capacity should be 
expanded
III. 1.2. AJtxwt FAXPFT
Although the plants of ALPET are nev  and the majority of them reached their 
optimum capacity in 1989 , see capacity utilization figures given in Appeendix, it is 
not the case for YARPET. The majority of the plants in Yarımca dated from the early 
1970. Beside their age, these plants have insufficient capacities:
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PRODUCT PRODUCTION/DEMAND ( % )
Table-3 Average Production /  Demand Patios For Several Products
PVC 39.8
LDPE 23.2
DDB 600
PS 32.6
Caprolactam 73.4
Carbon Black 94.2
SBR 86.3
CBR 112.9
Styrene 17.3
( Source; DPT Petrokimya 1990)
A pert from Carbon Black ( C-B ), SBR and CBR production of YARPET vas during 
1984 to 1988 very far from meeting the domestic demand. The figures are strikingly 
lovfor the tVD highly consumed plastics PVC and CD PE , 39.8 7« and 23 2 7*, 
respectively.
The age of the plants together v ith  their lov capacities result to increases in the 
output prices of the products.
For example the average sale price of PVC in 1987 including tax vas TL 1 008 000 
per ton ·. If an average value of TL 900 /  $ is token for 1987. the domestic price of 
PVC vas $ 1120 per ton. This value Is greater than foreign PVC prices.
• DPT Petrokimya 1990
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Table_6 Average Prices of PVC Products
Years Domestic 
( TL /  ton )
Vest Euope 
( i / t o n ,  FOB)
Japan
($ /  ton, FOB )
USA.
($ /to n , FOB)
1985 401000 447-476 549-589 549-582
1986 589000 507-530 561-585 515-542
1987 1008000 593-630 575-630 580-600
( Source: DPT Petrokimya 1990, Table -1 9 page 410)
If ve look at the capacities of the foreign PVC plants, ve can notice that these plants 
profit from economies of scale.
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The cai>ftcities of the PVC plants in European Community countries are the folloving
Table-7 PVC Capacities in European ComnunitT Countries
( in 1000 tons )
Years
Countries 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1995 2000
Belgium 310 310 310 310 310 310 310 310 310 310
France 1070 1015 1000 1005 1005 1025 10501 050 1050 1050
V.Germany 1445 1440 1440 1440 1440 1440 1 4401,440 1440 1440
Italy 935 890 865 870 715 730 755 805 865 865
Netherlands 370 370 370 370 370 370 370 370 370 370
Portugal 50 50 50 60 65 80 80 80 80 80
Spain 352 317 332 337 337 337 337 337 337 337
United Kingdom 505 505 485 455 470 470 470 470 470 470
TOTAL 5037 4897 4 852 4 847 4712 4 762 4 812 4 862 4 922 4 922
( Source : Tecnon Vorl<J Plastics, 1987)
Compered tilth the total domestic production of PVC ( ALPET and YARPET ) of 
152 000 tons /  year in 1987, only Portugal, a country of 1 /  6 th of Turkey in 
terms of population, has less production than Turkish production.
Besides, economics of scale, domestic plants are dependent to Imported ra v  material 
due to the Insufficient domestic input. This also Increases the cost of production. For 
instance, the primary ra v  material for PVC production, VCM , is provided from 
ALPET and YARPET. Yet, the VCM production remains insufficient, therefore, VCM 
had to be Imported.
The increase in imports is considerable since in 1986, 2 031 tons of VCM -vas imported 
liie reosin  1987 36600 tons had to be imported *
* DPT Petrokimya 1990, page 408
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The value of these imports i^as around $ 847 246 for 1986 and $ 18 886 428 for 1987.
Another striking example of inefficiency is the Styrene plant. This plant vnas out of 
production between 1982 and 1987.
Years
ТаЫе-8 Comparixoti of Capacity Utilizations in Styrene Plants
Capacity Utilizations, %
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Styrene, ΡΕΤΚίΜ 
Styrene, U S A.
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 43.3 966
83.0 89.0 90.0 91.0 96.0 N.A.
( Source: DPT, page 168-178)
The plant had to shut down, because the import of Styrene -was more profitable then 
producing it.
One of the most important reasons of this costly domestic production is again the lov 
capacity of the plant compared vith  the foreign competitors plants. The 19 450 tons 
/  year capacity is very lov compared to major Vest-European countries prodtjctlon.
Table-9 Vest-European Styrene Capacities
Country Annual Capacity ( 1 000 tons)
France 520
V. Germany 1130
Italy 380
Netherlands 995
Spain 100
iited Kingdom 220
( Source: Petroleumand Petrochemical Economics inEurope, 
Chemsystems, 1988)
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Another trouble vas the regulation of concerning the prohibition of the utili2ation 
of DDB in <3etergent manufacturing in 1987. Since DDB is only use<J by detergent 
producers, this plant has to export since 1987 all of its production or shut do'tim. So 
DDB plant is currently in a forcing position of underutilization of the capacity.
The capacity of this plant iras as follotra :
Table-lO Capacity ütlllzatloii in DDB Plant
Actual Utilization, %
Capacity (tons) 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Ayerage
1989
20000 91.8 55.8 66.1 51.5 41.3 25.0 552
111.1.3. FJmndaJ R^uir^ments
As can be deducted from the aboya analysis , РЕТКІМ needs to access to financial 
sowcas In order to meet domestic demand and update Its plants trtth old technology 
and/or insufficient capacity. Besides, the previously calculated average annual 
import re<iuirements of $ 497.7 milion. The investments that РЕТКІМ should 
undertake necessitates large amounts of funds.
The cost of these investments can be approximately evaluated by the recent similar 
investments made throughout the irorld.
For Instance, the 24 000 tons / year of expansion requirement of the PP plant from 
66 000 tons to 90 000 tons per year may cost around $ 10 million, because in 
Czecholavakia, the cost of an expansion of 22 500 tons /  year in the PP plant of 
Technoexports in 1990 is $ 9 million * . Also, an expansion of LD PE plant of 
around 40 000 tons that РЕТКІМ plans may cost around $ 40 million. This figixre is 
slightly less than $ 93 million vhich is the cost of a recent expansion that Shell 
undertook at Carrington, U K. Also, the construction of a LAB plant vhich does not 
exist currently in Turkey may cost $ 110 million vhich is the cost of a nev  50 000 
tons /  year of LAB production plant in Iran.
> European Chemical Nevs/ Chemscope page 54
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Fof the other Investment*, that is the construction of nev  styrene, SBR end CArbon 
Bletck plants, a comparable cost value is not found because generally the cost of the 
vhole complexes are given in the literature, and frequently the cost of individual 
plants.
But even for the investments mentioned above PETKIM requires in total a vali» of 
$ 160 million in addition to the annual Import requirements of $ 500 million. It 
ce« be seen that access to large financial sources Is crucial for PETKlM in order to 
operate effectively.
111 - 2. Privatisation Methods
111.2.1. PubJjc Offering
As of mid- 1990 Turkish government sold a small portion , around 7 of total 
shores of PETKlM to the public. For the remaining majority of the shares, the 
privatisation method is as yet unknoim.
If the government continues the privatisation by public share offering, this may 
stimulate the groirth of the capital markets in Turkey. Also, iridespread stockoimers 
can be created. For instance in U.K. £ 16.9 billions of proceeds vere generated 
through public shore offering ( See Appendix Table ^  ) ·.
Hoirever, the relatively underdeveloped nature of domestic capital markets in Turkey 
limits the size of the issue ( See Appendix, the composition of capital market 
development in some industrialised countries and LDCs ) ^ .
In order to overcome this problem, strong advertising compelgns are generally 
effective to stimulate the avareness of the investors and to Increase the corporate 
image. Advertising is an important issue and it vas videly used in France vhen the 
petrochemical company ELF AQUITAINE vas privatised in 1986 ^ . Also, the shares 
can be offered to foreign markets like France and U K. practiced. Selling the stocks in 
Germany might be a potential issue since many Turkish citizens live in this country.
• BISHOP M R. and KAY J.A. ( 1989 )
2 Morgan Bank ( 1986 )
3 Vielvoye ( 1986 )
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Hoirever, the impect of selling the stocks to a diffuse list of shareholders on 
performance is a controversial issue.
It is very likely that increasing the number of stockholders vill only create a group 
of speculators and vill not contribute much to the economy. In other irords it is 
doubtful that people irho Just profit from the potential dividend payments and capital 
gains of their stocks and irtio has no stakes In the company other than th a t , vlll 
make a positive contribution on the performance of the economy. In addition, if 
capital gains are higher in financial markets, it is probable that "workers and 
managers may not be motivated to increase the performance of the company on their 
own. The hope of a future return may not be a strong motive to work harder today. 
In addition, if the number of stockholders is very large the relation between the 
shareholders and the company will be looser since the marginal contribution of a 
single worker will be negligible.
It Is probably better If the stocks were sold to entrepreneurs with capitalist spirit and 
who can take risks instead of to providing easy returns to the man on the street.
Also, even though Incentives and special offers are given to small individual owners, 
the stocks may be gathered in the hands of fewer people at the end of the selling 
process. As an example, in the privatisation of the British Aerospace, the number of 
shareholders were 158 000 in the first months following the sale of the stocks in the 
ceqpltal market, however, at the end of the first year this number fell to 26 000 ·.
Therefore public share offering should be limited, at least below 50 % so that the 
company would not be in the hands of nonprofessionals.
111.2.2. Direct. SeJJJng MeWod
If the remaining shares of PETKIM ( more than 90 % ) were to sold directly to private 
sector, bypassing capital markets, there Is a high probabllty that the stocks will be 
boiçht entirely by big multinational companies since Turkish private sector is not 
strong enough to buy PETKÎM.
i TÜSIAD ( 1986 )
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The acquisition of PETKÏM by a multinational firm may have several <lra'vbacks 
▼hich can t>e classified as folloirs :
a ) Contradiction vith the objects of privatisation
Privatisation and transfer to private sector are different events. The second one 
is contradictory to the principle of spreading the capital to masses. The 
difference betiæen the privatisation and transfer to private sector are fairly 
clear in the context of ovmership, management, ideology, aim and control of 
monopolies. In the privatisation, the joint control and ovnershlp, efficiency of 
government activities, philosophy of capital distribution anti trust policies are 
predominant. Vhereas, in the transfer of ovmership, individual oimership 
instead of shared ownership, efficiency of private capital ovners, grouping the 
capital in one hand instead of spreading it out to the masses and the goals of the 
entrepreneur are prevalent. Also, there are the risk and incentive to 
monopolize.
b ) Employees stand point
The regulation concerning the interdiction to go on strike inthe petrochemical 
industry constitute# a threat for the vr>rkers for being exploited by the foreign 
management: There is a probabilty that the "vages vdll be kept lov.
Also, the application of the personnel by contract procedure constitutes a risk of 
increased firing vhich vdll irorsen further the already high unemployment in 
the country.
c ) Profit measiire
Multinational companies may transfer abroad major part of their income. Vhile 
they may shov their import input prices high, they may, on the other hand, 
shov their export prices lov. Thus, they may minimize their tax liabilities.
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d ) ConceeJment of technological information
Although it may be consi<Jere<J a uray to obtain sophisticated management and 
technology it is possible that foreign companies may not reveal to Turkish 
engineers the details of the nev  technologies that they vill bring. They may be 
reluctant to teach Turkish employees because they may think that the holding of 
this knoTsledge is one of their most important assets that made them strong.
e) Acquisition at lov price
Foreign monopolies irtilch Intend to buy ΡΕΤΚίΜ may buy it at the lowest price. 
They may cooperate among themselves, form ifdiat is celled an olygopsony. Thus, 
they may increase their negotiation porer iidth the Turkish government and may 
buy PETKIM at the minimum possible price.
f) Increased foreign economic and political dependence
Selling ΡΕΤΚίΜ to foreign capital irill increase the dependence of Turkish 
economy to foreign countries. This vdll further Induce a political dependence as 
inell. The Intervention of multinational ITT into political affairs In Chile is an 
example of the abuse of economic potrer of multinationals in the developing 
countries.
g) Formation of a private monopoly
The sale of ΡΕΤΚίΜ stocks to private sector vill create a private monopoly from 
state monopoly. This situation vlll obviously not form a free market structure 
vdiich is one of the aims of the privatisation policy. Instead, a private monopoly 
vill be even vorse than a state monopoly vhere pricing decisions vere made to 
protect consumers, vhereas in the former this may not happen.
h) Effects on domestic production
The nev  foreign ovners may schedule production at their vill and the probabllty 
of shut dovn decision is alvays present. The fact that Turkey has the advantage of 
being a lov labor cost country may provide, in the short run an incentive of 
time, hovever, in the long run, the foreign company mey decide to close the 
plant for some other reasons.
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Management Buyout ( MBO ) consists the acquisition of PETKÎM by management or 
workers using a small amount of equity and a large amount of borroved funds.
MBO is a -vay of improving the profitability of a company since managers Incentive 
toirards higher performance Trill be greater. The assets of the company Trill be 
utilised in a more productive manner. The success of MBO depends also on the extent 
of entrepreneurial spirit of the management. This technique i?as used in the 
privatisation of National Freight Corporation in the U K. in 1981, and the company 
T?8s transformed into a highly profitable enterprise after the sale *.
HoTrever, this technique is difficult to implement in Turkey because obtaining large 
amounts of long term credit to finance these operations is practically impossible for 
the moment. Since this technique is as yet unknoTm to Turkish financial sector its 
implementation to Turkey may take long time.
Nevertheless, a portion of the shares may be reserved for Trorkers end managers as a 
motivation factor for these people toTwds higher performence. In order to prevent 
difficulties to finance the purchase of these stocks, the sale of the stocks can be 
accompanied irith some STreeteners. For instance, one -way might be the sole of the 
stocks by Installments. For Trorkers, a principle payment may not be required. In 
order to provide ease of payment for Trorkers, the housing fxmd or the dividend on 
the stocks might be used. Also, until the maturity date of the payments of the stocks, 
HDPPA may hold the stocks. In the cose of failure to pay during the prescribed 
period, public participation fund may become the legal oimer of the stocks.
111.2.3. Workforce Buyout
• Morgan Bank ( 1986 )
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IV IMPLICATION OF PRIVATISATION
IV. 1. Use of the Proceeds
The actual reasons behind privatisation in developped countries and Turkey are quite 
different. Reduction of deficits and of rates of inflation plays generally a 
determining role In LDCs vhereas in developped countries like U K. end France 
revenue generated from the sale of public assets is a. major consideration. Also, in 
Ü.K. and in Franco , privatisation offers an opportunity to build popular capitalism 
and ffliddld-cless electoral support. Hotrevar, in Turkey the rationale is more 
economic than social or political. Turkey has large external debts amounting to $ 41 
billion as of end of 1989 · and irith heavy servicing requirements. For Instance in 
1988 the servicing requirements including both the principle and the interest vere 
above $ 8 billions and only $ 5 billions vere borroTs e^d. Thus Turkey had to find 
out $ 3 billions in 1989. Therefore, it is crucial for Turkey to maintain 
creditworthiness and access to external capital. Budget deficit reduction may be the 
quickest and most direct route to improve public finances and reducing inflation. 
Inflation reduction will protect efforts to expand exports through currency 
devaluation, and export expansion may be the measure of international 
creditworthiness. As a result, privatisation in Turkey is an attempt to strentghen the 
state fiscally through deficit reduction rather than being a way of implementing a 
popular capitalism. It is merely an offer of equities to the public as a way of moving 
toward fiscal balance Instead of increasing public debt or increasing taxes.
In this context, Heller and Schiller 2 argue that, there is no net change in the fiscal 
position of the government after privatisation especially over the medium-term. The 
sales proceeds reduce the deficit in the initial period, in subsequent periods, 
revenues remain as before privatisation. In initially reducing the government’s 
deficit, privatisation only alters the composition of the government's asset holding. 
If the funds are neither spent nor used to cut taxes, the underlying fiscal policy will 
be tmchanged both in the period of the sale and in the subsequent periods. Howe^.^r, 
if the authorities use the proceeds of the privatisation to increase expenditure or limit 
taxation, this implies a higher deficit in subsequent periods, relative to pre­
privatisation position. •
• DIE Monthly Economic Indicators 4 /1990 
2 Heller, P S. end Schiller C. (1989 )
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IV.2. Gains in Productive Efficiency
High productive efficiency means that a given level of output is obtained at a loirer 
cost. As mentioned previously in the description of PETKİM, the company’s output 
prices for some products ere higher compered to major developing countries output 
prices due to insufficient capacities of YARPET, strong dependence to foreign Import 
Inputs (as in PVC) and/or to old technology. Thus, in terms of productive efficiency 
PETKtM has poorer performance compared to its foreign competitors.
The question here is whether changing oimership by privatisation vill improve the 
productive efficiency of PETKİM. If PETKİM v"ere to sold entirely to private sector by 
any privatisation method described previously, the nev  ovners have to finance the 
required investments end bring nev  technology. Otherwise, there vill be no gain in 
productive efficiency. Hoirever, in order to perform the required changes , 
privatisation is not required, because unsatisfactory performance under public 
o-imership and succès in private ownership is not a universal phenomenon. For 
instance, in Turkey, there are cases vhen government had to pick up failing private 
sectors such as in the nationalisation of the steel manufacturer Asil Çelik.
1 V.3. Gains in Allocative Efficiency
A high allocative efficiency means that output prices more closely reflect scarcity 
values.
The monopolistic situation of PETKİM and the tariffs on import products makes 
PETKİM a profitable company. As an example, let us consider the case of LD PE, one of 
the most irtdely used plastic rav  materials:
According to 1987 import regime, the tariffs on LD PE vere as follovs
1) GIF price I 000 unit
2) Custom duty 0.150
3) Shore of municipality 0.0.23
4) Stamp duty 0.040
5) Support and price stabilization fund 0 020
6) Intermediate sum 1.233
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7) Harbour duty
8) Cost Tirith tariffs
9) Costlncludlng V. A T.
10) Fund ($/ton)
0.062
1.295
1.425
70.000
In 1987, the import CIF price of LDPE is TL 16.98 billions in toted. The quantity 
imported is 25234 tons. So in average, foreign LDPE costs ; TL 672902/ton.
Including the tariffs the cost becomes ; 672902* 1.425 + 70 « TL 956955/ton.
The domestic price of LDPE per ton including V.A.T. and other duties in 1987 is 
TL 907135.
Thus the foreign product becomes 5 71 % more expensive than domestic one.
Therefore. Imports ere made ertiflcielly expensive end PETKÎM abuses this situation 
by producing the same product as foreigners at a higher cost but charging higher 
prices to foreign products.
The impact of changing of oimership through privatisation is again unclear because 
if the same privileges are accorded to the private owiers, nothing vdll change in 
terms of allocative efficiency.
In fact, the Important issue here Is the fact that type of oumership is not relevant in 
terms of efficiency improvements. Rather, market conditions, the regulatory 
environment of PETICÎM is more important.
Therefore, vhat must be done is to enhance competition, that is to break the 
monopolistic situation of PETKÎM. Only, if the company is run according to market 
disciplines there can be a significant improvement in efficiencies and performance.
Several measures should be taken together vith privatisation if better performance is 
aimed.
Thus anti-damping regulatlonf should be established in the petrochemical industry, 
especially if all the remaining shares Trere to be sold at one time Also, anti-damping 
regulations should be established. Otherwise, Turkish petrochemical industry vdll be 
seriously damaged by the imports of lov quality and lov cost products.
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Furthermore, the privatised company should not be alloired to neglect domestic 
market even if for instance exports "were more profitable.
In addition, if a multinational group take a significant share in PETKlM this firm 
should not be alloired to reduce the production in Turkey, A multinetlonal group may 
prefer, for instance, to Introduce in the Turkish market the proditcts of one of Its 
suubsldlarles and therefore cut or cease the production of PETKIM.
Also, the nev  oimers should not be allowed to apply high price policy for some 
products if the import of the same product is difficult. Also, the production of some 
basic input products for the doimstream Industry should not be ceased at vlll. 
Therefore, unusual gains vlll not be alloTred and doimstreem plastic industry -vill be 
saved.
So, only if the above regulatory changes are performed that privatisation vill 
contribute to an Increase in performance.
IV.4. Managerial Efficiency
PETKÎM also faces some bureaucratic problems. For instance, decision making 
process is xisually considered to be slov, a simple purchasing process may require up 
to 19 signitures sometimes i .
Also, any Important decision has to be approved by institutions external to PETKlM 
such as the Treasury and Foreign Trade Institution. In addition, institutions like the 
Prime Ministry Higher Auditing Council and Mixed Commission of State Economic 
Enterprises of the Turkish Assembly Intervene in the auditing mechanism of PETKIM 
vhich obviously Increase the bureaucracy of the operations.
The impact of privatisation on managerial efficiency relies in the belief that private 
sector operates better. Because under private OTnershlp, there vlll be less political 
interference in the decision making process of the firm. Managers and perhaps 
irorkers as irell, may receive higher salaries more clearly linked to productivity and 
profitability norms. Also, private companies due to the fear of bankri^tcy and 
making losses ore run according to market dlclpllnes. Furthermore, disinterested 
government bureaucrats can be replaced by self-interested shareholders and these
• iktisadi Araçtirmalar Vakfi - PETKÎM ( 1986 )
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latter may impose commercial profitability as the main objective of the firm 8H<1 
judge managers on their success or failure to achieve this goal.
The main issue is that vith a change to private ownership, assets become tradeable, 
the discipline of commercial capital markets is imposed, a market develops for 
managers, and the managers thus respond to nev  signals and incentives. 
Efficiency vill improve as managers maximize their profit. If efficiency does not 
improve, the enterprise l i l l  go out of business if it is operating in a competetive 
market and if government does not intervene.
Hoirever, given the prevailing monopolistic situation of PETKÎM vhich results in an 
imperfect competition, given the presence of protections from imports, the same 
factors vhich cause public enterprise inefficiency vill act on private ovners.
Therefore, privatisation may not be the only ansver to managerial efficiency. 
Government may adopt other type of reforms. For instance, government may create 
approprite incentive systems, to attract and revard good managers. Government may 
isolate PETKIM from excessive or inapproprite supervision. In short, government 
should be able to supply PETKIM vlth the necessary set of goals and proper 
managerial autonomy vhich vould allov PETKÎM to attain good perfotmance levels 
under state ovnership.
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V COHCLUSION
The problems of PETKÎM can be i<ientlfie<l as insufficient capacity to meet the 
growing demand of petrochemicals in Tttrkey, lov allocative efficiency di« to 
increase in input costs relative to foreign competitors, abuse of monopolistic position 
and imperfect competition, and finally bureaucratic restrictions on efficient 
management.
Privatisation alone is unlikely, however, to overcome these problems unless it is 
accompanied by a librealization program vhich can create a competitive market 
environment. Furthermore, privatisation is not re<juired to solve these problems. 
Government may tpell adopt necessary reforms to establish a competitive 
environment and bring nev  technology and PETKIM may veil continue to be a 
profitable company in public ovnership.
In fact, privatisation in Turkey seems to be more an attempt to reduce public deficits 
rather than being a solution method to the problems of PETKtM or even a vay of 
implementing a popular capitalism.
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APPENDIX
Table-1 T rea iu ry - SEE’* Cash Elov 
( Billion TL )
Year
Net Cash Flov
Current Prices Constant Prices (1971 base year)
1971 (-)2.93 (-)2.93
1972 (-)1.12 (_)0.97
1973 1.80 129
1974 241 1.36
1973 (-)0,20 (-)OIO
1976 3.82 1.63
1977 1.40 0.46
1978 9.45 2.07
1979 (-) 25.09 (-)353
1980 (->39.46 (-)2.62
1981 23.78 1 15
1982 1151 045
1983 77.74 2 31
1984 (-) 252.04 (-)4 92
1985 1674.71 23.36
1986 3041.07 3348
1987 3961.74 31.38
( Source : KÎT Yıllık Genel Raporu)
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Table-2 Sectoral Profit-Loss Conditions of Sees, 1967-1967 
( With current prices in TL million )
Year
1%7
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
Mining
397
238
427
269
557
451
116
(-)378
(-)1498
(-)5461
(->10745
(->3294
1642
16395
39597
61360
113570
138016
297957
323104
493682
Manuf.
514
542
491
672
674
1130
190
2569
1256
121
(->3419
(->2797
5023
13474
22229
9935
(->14144
158612
240480
321151
325764
Energy
295
234
278
147
293
571
229
83
494
1463
2048
2095
3910
14947
19127
41761
(->14400
151866
277965
24174
(->31054
Trade
70
72
74
(->98
(->74
(->106
234
205
289
70
(->89
702
2063
8366
17216
9370
20115
72570
96823
82270
(->25600
Comm. 
(->384 
(->455 
(->772 
(->1451 
(->690 
(->614 
(->61 
( >1376 
(->1945 
(->2223 
(->4754 
(->9751 
(->9500 
(->11093 
18315 
50467 
65840 
225579 
352009 
361683 
395667
Banking
321
357
250
(->178
299
472
707
846
1326
2355
2421
1731
2485
12924
36865
34663
30920
71633
71461
115919
263118
TOTAL
1213
988
748
(->639
1059
1904
1415
1949
(->78
(->3675
(->14538
(->11314
6323
55013
153349
207556
201901
818276
1336695
1228309
1421577
( Source: Kit Yillik Genel Rajporu >
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ТаМв-3 Slxe of Turkish Petrochemicdl Market By Value
Market Size 
1988 TL DOOM
PETKiM's Share 
1987,% 1988,%
Benzene 27 88 100
P-Xylene 44 57 61
PVC 231 75 83
LDPE 260 82 90
HDPE 81 78 89
PP 180 68 67
ACN 155 41 49
MEG 115 62 63
PTA 44 3 38
Carbon Black 35 71 71
PS 116 31 34
Caprolactam 48 100 100
CBR 12 100 100
SBR 37 88 100
TOTAL 1373
( Source : Samuel Montagu-T.E.B. 1989)
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TaMe-4 PriTatiiation by Share Offer in ÜX.
Date Company % of Equity Price (£ffl)
October 1981 Cable & Vireless 49 224
February 1982 Amersham International 100 71
November 1982 Britoil 51 549
February 1983 Associated British Ports 52 22
June 1984 Enterprise Oil 100 392
July 1984 Jaguar 100 294
November 1984 British Telecom 51 3916
December 1986 British Gas 100 5434
February 1987 British Air-ways 100 900
May 1987 Rolls Royce 100 1363
July 1987 British Airports Authority 100 1225
November 1988 British Steel 100 2500
TOTAL 16 890
( Source : Vorld Development 1989)
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Teble-5 Production ond Penond  Figuro» for SoTorol Product»
PRODUCTS
1984 
P D
1985 
P D
YEARS 
1986 
P D
1987 
P D
1908 
P D
PVC 41.1 89.5 420 69.7 39.5 116.8 42 2 144 2 445 119 0
LD PE 25.6 99.7 30.4 91.1 256 117.0 302 165.9 27.3 1610
DDE 18.4 32.1 11 1 22.4 132 19.4 103 155 8.3
PS 15 2 159 164 27.3 158 382 15.3 500 192 510
Caprolactam 8 1 227 13.7 181 93 17.7 20.1 180 195 21 0
Carbon Black 252 24 8 22.3 22.2 23.7 236 331 335 32.0 460
SBR 20.4 21 2 196 24.5 15.7 196 21.1 210 27 9 32 0
CBR 8.5 7.3 8.6 82 69 66 114 92 12 6 n o
Sytrane 00 22.8 0.0 22.3 00 22.7 8.4 33.1 18.8 30.7
P : Production In 1000 ton», D : Demond In 1000 tons 
( Source : DPT Petroklmyei 1990)
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Figure 1 Trading Turnover : Comparison of 
Developing Countries 1984
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(Source: MORGAN BANK, P r iv a t isa t io n  Master Plan, 1986)
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Figure 2 Coitiparisoii of Development of Capital 
Markets (shares to QHP 1 8^4)
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(Source: MORGAN SANK, P r iv a t isa t io n  Master Plan, 1986)
